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OPINION OF THE COURT SUR PETITION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF EN BANC OPINION 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This opinion is prompted by an unusual concatenation of 
circumstances: (1) the United States Sentencing 
Commission adopted an amendment to the Sentencing 
Guidelines rendering more flexible the circumstances under 
which a sentencing court can make a downward departure 
when a defendant convicted of certain kinds of offenses has 
been shown to possess significantly reduced mental 
capacity at the time of the offense; (2) this court, sitting en 
banc, filed an opinion one day before adoption of the 
Guideline amendment rejecting the interpretation that the 
Guideline amendment suddenly recognized; and (3) because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Judge Mansmann sat on the original en banc panel but has been 
unable to participate in this decision due to illness. 
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the amendment is a "clarifying" amendment which, under 
our jurisprudence, applies to pending cases, it becomes 
possible that the defendant, who sought relief from our 
decision before our mandate was issued and who clearly 
had significantly reduced mental capacity at the time of the 
offense, could receive a lesser sentence than that which the 
district court imposed and which the en banc court of 
appeals affirmed. 
 
Shortly after we filed our opinion, and when the terms of 
the newly-adopted Guideline amendment became known, 
defendant Muhammad Askari sought reconsideration of our 
en banc decision. We granted the motion. We now vacate 
the en banc opinion and remand the case to the district 
court so that it may reconsider the sentence in light of the 
Guidelines amendment, and, in particular, make findings 
or draw legal conclusions in the first instance about the 
two facts that will likely determine whether Askari's 
sentence will be reduced: (1) whether Askari's offense 
involved "actual violence or a serious threat of violence"; 
and (2) whether Askari's criminal history indicates "a need 
to incarcerate the defendant or protect the public." See 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13.1 Before explaining our ratio decedendi, 
we will recapitulate the facts of the majority in our first en 
banc opinion. 
 




On the afternoon of April 23, 1992, Askari entered the 
First Bank of Philadelphia at 1424 Walnut Street in 
Philadelphia. He approached a closed teller's window and 
said two or three times, "Put the money on the counter." He 
then went to an open window and told the bank teller, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from 
significantly reduced mental capacity . . . a lower sentence may be 
warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity 
contributed to the commission of the offense, provided that the 
defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration to 
protect the public." 
 
                                3 
  
Ellen Ishizaki, "You have three seconds to give me the 
money." After Ishizaki gave him bait money, he ran out the 
door. Askari was not seen carrying a weapon, nor did he 
use force or make specific verbal threats of harm, though 
when he demanded money from the teller he had his hand 
underneath his shirt. Two bank employees, along with a 
Center City Special District employee, all of whom were 
unarmed, chased Askari and caught him two blocks away. 
Police later found the bait money in Askari's pants. They 
did not recover a weapon. (See Presentence Report PP 5-8). 
 
Askari was indicted for bank robbery under 18 U.S.C.A. 
S 2113(a), and a jury found him guilty. Before sentencing, 
the district court found that Askari was not mentally 
competent and committed him, under 18 U.S.C. S 4244(d), 
to a federal institution for psychiatric care and treatment.2 
After the warden at the U.S. Medical Center for Federal 
Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri certified that Askari had 
recovered and was again mentally competent, the court 
sentenced him to 210 months in prison. (See App. at 58a, 
68a).3 At sentencing, defense counsel argued for a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Dr. Edward Guy examined Askari to assess whether he was competent 
to stand trial. Dr. Guy initially concluded that Askari was suffering from 
paranoid schizophrenia in partial remission, drug addiction, and a 
seizure disorder, but he concluded that Askari was competent to stand 
trial. Following a second psychiatric evaluation before Askari's 
sentencing, Dr. Guy testified that Askari was not competent. Noting 
Askari's "history of serious mental illness," Dr. Guy found Askari too 
delusional to be able to cooperate with his attorney. The district court 
then ordered Askari's commitment. After two years of treatment at the 
U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, Askari 
was diagnosed as suffering from "Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type currently 
in remission with antipsychotic medication." The report noted that 
Askari initially "exhibited delusional thinking and auditory 
hallucinations," which improved with medication. The report concluded 
that Askari was now competent. (See App. at 62a-67a, 68a). 
3. Askari qualified as "a career offender in that he was at least 18 years 
old at the time of the instant offense, the instant offense [was] a felony 
involving violence and the defendant [had] at least two prior felony 
convictions for crimes of violence." Presentence Report P 33. (See App. at 
56a (district court noting, during sentencing, that Askari "has a long 
history of crime including violent crime . . . . the criminal history 
score 
in this case takes him pretty much to the top of the range" but 
concluding "[b]ecause I am satisfied that the low end of the sentencing 
range will provide a sufficient deterrent and punishment I am going to 
sentence him at the bottom of the range with the discretion I have")). 
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downward departure based on Askari's diminished mental 
capacity, citing his history of serious psychiatric illness and 
his diagnosis as a paranoid schizophrenic. That Askari 
suffered from some mental illness at the time he committed 
the bank robbery was not in dispute. 
 
The district court, however, declined to grant the 
departure, explaining that the Sentencing Guidelines 
"contain a policy statement that a downward departure for 
diminished capacity is limited to non[-]violent offenses . . . . 
[The] commission says [there is] no downward departure for 
diminished capacity at the time of the offense, if the offense 
is a violent crime." (App. at 45a). The court also rejected 
defendant's motion for downward departure based on 
unusual, mitigating circumstances not adequately 




Askari appealed his sentence, contending that the district 
court should have granted him a downward departure for 
diminished capacity under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13 because (1) 
the unarmed bank robbery was non-violent; and (2) he has 
a well-documented history of serious psychiatric illness. A 
panel rejected Askari's arguments and affirmed the 
judgment: 
 
       In United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 
       1990), we held that the district court did not have the 
       authority in a bank robbery sentence to depart 
       downward because that offense is not a `non-violent' 
       offense. We so concluded by looking to a separate 
       guidelines provision, [USSG] S 4B1.2, which defines 
       robbery as a `crime of violence.' Although the circuits 
       are split on this point, we are bound by our prior 
       holding. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0, p.s. (permitting the imposition of a sentence 
outside the range established by the Guidelines "if the court finds `that 
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a 
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that described' "). 
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United States v. Askari, No. 95-1662, 1997 WL 92051, at *2 
(3d Cir. Mar. 5, 1997) ("Askari I"), Order Vacating Opinion 
and Granting Rehearing En Banc, Mar. 27, 1997. 
 
The panel highlighted the disagreement among the courts 
of appeals as to whether the "crime of violence" definition 
contained in U.S.S.G. S 4B1.25 governs the "non-violent" 
offense requirement of U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13: 
 
       Four other circuits have reached the same conclusion 
       that this court reached in Rosen. United States v. 
       Mayotte, 76 F.3d 887, 889 (8th Cir. 1996); United 
       States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591-93 (7th Cir. 1991) (en 
       banc) (6-5 decision); United States v. Maddalena, 893 
       F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Borrayo, 
       898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1989). However, two circuits, 
       following Judge Easterbrook's dissent in Poff, have 
       concluded that the "non-violent offense" requirement of 
       S 5K2.13 is not governed by the "crime of violence" 
       definition contained in S 4B1.2. United States v. 
       Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994); United 
       States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 
       1993). 
 
Askari I, 1997 WL 92051, at *2 n.2. 
 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Becker, recognizing our 
controlling precedent in Rosen, suggested "that our decision 
in Rosen, that a downward departure is not available under 
S 5K2.13 of the sentencing guidelines in relation to a crime, 
the commission of which involves no violence in fact, is 
incorrect and should be reconsidered by the Court en 
banc." Askari I, 1997 WL 92051, at *2 (Becker, J., 
concurring). According to Judge Becker: 
 
       While `crimes of violence' and `non-violent offense' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1 enhances the offense level for "career offenders." See 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, comment. (backg'd.) (28 U.S.C. S 994(h) "mandates 
that the Commission assure that certain `career' offenders receive a 
sentence of imprisonment `at or near the maximum term authorized.' " 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1 implements this directive by employing a definition of 
career offender that tracks in large part the criteria set forth in 28 
U.S.C. 
S 994(h)). U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2 provides definitions for terms used in USSG 
S 4B1.1, including "crime of violence." 
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       employ the same root word, the phrases `readily may 
       take meanings other than as opposites.' More 
       importantly, the distinct objectives of the two 
       provisions at issue -- S 4B1.2 and S 5K2.13 -- counsel 
       that the meaning of the former not govern that of the 
       latter. 
 
       * * * 
 
       In short, some factors at work in the departure 
       sections of the Guidelines are in tension with those at 
       work under the career offender sections, and it does 
       not make sense to import a career offender-based 
       definition of `crime of violence' into a departure section 
       in the absence of specific cross-reference. Rather, it is 
       better to permit the district courts to consider all the 
       facts and circumstances surrounding the commission 
       of a crime when deciding whether it qualifies as a non- 
       violent offense under S 5K2.13. 
 
Id. at *4-6 (citations omitted). 
 
Pursuant to the Internal Operating Procedures, the court 
voted to rehear the case en banc. We, therefore, vacated our 




After hearing argument, the en banc court was deeply 
divided. The majority, after an exhaustive analysis of the 
competing positions, determined that Rosen was incorrect 
and that the Sentencing Commission "did not intend to 
import the `crime of violence' definition from U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.2 to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13." United States v. Askari, No. 
19-1662, Slip Op. at 21 (3d Cir. April 8, 1988) ("Askari II"). 
Instead, the majority concluded that: 
 
       We believe that departures under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13 
       exclude conduct that involves actual force, threat of 
       force, or intimidation, the latter two measured under a 
       reasonable person standard. Therefore, "non-violent 
       offenses" under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13 are those which do 
       not involve a reasonable perception that force against 
       persons may be used in committing the offense. 
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       Although conviction and sentencing are separate, 
       sentencing has always been tied to the crime of 
       conviction at least in the sense that they must be 
       congruent. If the elements of the crime require a 
       finding of violent conduct, then a valid conviction could 
       hardly permit a sentence based on a finding of non- 
       violent conduct. So long as the bank robbery victim 
       has been threatened with harm, and is seen to have 
       been threatened under an objective standard 
       (reasonable person), the defendant cannot be found to 
       have acted in a non-violent manner. 
 
Askari II, Slip Op. at 26. Relying on the testimony of Ms. 
Ishizaki, the bank teller, the majority found that 
 
       an ordinary person in the bank teller's position 
       reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm from 
       Askari's demand and actions. Looking at the elements 
       of the crime and the surrounding conduct, Askari did 
       not commit a "non-violent offense." 
 
Id. at 27. 
 
Judge Stapleton, joined by Judge Sloviter, concurred. 
Though agreeing that Rosen was incorrect and that Askari 
did not qualify for a S 5K2.13 departure, Judge Stapleton 
reached this result by a somewhat different route. See id. at 
30 (Stapleton, J., concurring). Judge Stapleton would have 
held that Askari's bank robbery offense does not qualify as 
a "non-violent offense" because "a federal bank robbery 
conviction necessarily involves a finding that the offense 
involved actual force or a threat of force, and that such a 
finding . . . precludes characterization of the offense as a 
non-violent one for purposes of S 5K2.13." Id. 
 
Judge McKee, joined by Judge Lewis, concurred as well. 
Like Judge Stapleton, Judge McKee agreed that Rosen 
should be rejected. However, Judge McKee believed that the 
majority incorrectly held that Askari's crime was not a 
"non-violent offense" based upon the elements of the crime, 
and would have required an "individualized inquiry into the 
specifics of his conduct to determine if his `actual conduct' 
amounts to a `non-violent offense' as that term is used in 
S 5K2.13 notwithstanding the elements of his crime." Id. at 
36 (McKee, J., concurring). Still, Judge McKee joined in the 
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judgment, relying on the fact that S 5K2.13 is restricted to 
those persons whose criminal history does not indicate a 
need for incarceration to protect the public. See id. at 41. 
Since the district court had noted that Askari had a long 
history of crime, including violent crime, Judge McKee 
concluded that Askari would be ineligible for the departure 
regardless of whether his acts were classified as a "non- 
violent offense" because his criminal history suggests a 
need to protect the public. See id. 
 
Judge Garth similarly agreed with the majority's 
judgment, but reached that conclusion for different reasons 
and wrote separately. Unlike the majority or the other 
concurrences, Judge Garth would not have overruled 
Rosen, and would instead construe "non-violent offense" as 
the opposite of "crime of violence" as that term is used in 
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2. See id. at 42 (Garth, J., concurring). 
 
Judge Becker, joined by Judges Nygaard and Roth, 
dissented. Though agreeing with the majority that Rosen 
was incorrect, the dissent contended that the majority erred 
by precluding sentencing judges from granting S 5K2.13 
departures in bank robbery cases. Id. at 46, 51 ("Thus, 
under the majority's construction . . . Muhammad Askari 
could not qualify for a departure under S 5K2.13 regardless 
of the factual circumstances underlying his offense. To that 
end, the majority's `reasonable perception' standard does 
not save its opinion from being analytically identical to 
Rosen.") (Becker, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, 
the case should have been remanded to the district court so 
that the sentencing judge could consider all the facts and 
circumstances of the crime and decide in the first instance 
whether Askari's acts qualify as a "non-violent offense." See 
id. at 46. 
 
The dissent also disagreed that Askari was ineligible for 
a S 5K2.13 departure because his criminal history suggests 
a need to protect the public. See id. at 53 n.5. The dissent 
reasoned that, while the district court did find that Askari 
had a long history of crime, it did not make an express 
finding about the need for incarceration to protect the 
public. See id. On that basis, the dissent contended that 
this question also needed to be decided by the district court 
in the first instance. See id. 
 




One day before our en banc opinion was filed, on April 7, 
1998, the United States Sentencing Commission adopted 
an amendment to S 5K2.13, which revised that guideline to 
read as follows: 
 
       A sentence below the applicable guideline range may be 
       warranted if the defendant committed the offense while 
       suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity. 
       However, the court may not depart below the 
       applicable guideline range if (1) the significantly 
       reduced mental capacity was caused by the voluntary 
       use of drugs or other intoxicants; (2) the facts and 
       circumstances of the defendant's offense indicate a 
       need to protect the public because the offense involved 
       actual violence or a serious threat of violence, or (3) the 
       defendant's criminal history indicates a need to 
       incarcerate the defendant or protect the public. If a 
       departure is warranted, the extent of the departure 
       should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental 
       capacity contributed to the commission of the offense. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13 (amendment proposed April 7, 1998) 
(emphasis added). Most importantly for present purposes, 
the amendment substituted the highlighted language in 
place of the "non-violent offense" requirement in the version 
of S 5K2.13 existing at the time Askari was originally 
sentenced and Askari I and Askari II were decided. See 
supra n. 1. 
 
On April 20, 1998, Askari timely filed a petition for 
reconsideration of our en banc opinion based on this 
proposed amendment. He argued that the proposed 
amendment should be treated under our jurisprudence as 
a "clarifying amendment," which applies to the present 
case. On the merits, Askari contended that, under the 
proposed amendment, the question whether his offense 
indicates "a need to protect the public because the offense 
involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence" is 
properly for the district court to consider in thefirst 
instance on the basis of all the facts and circumstances of 
the offense. 
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The government filed an answer to the petition. It agreed 
with Askari that the proposed amendment is "clarifying." 
However, the government countered Askari's argument that 
a remand is necessary. Because a reasonable person could 
infer a threat of harm from defendant's actions, the 
government argued, Askari's threat of violence was 
"serious" and therefore even under the proposed 
amendment the S 5K2.13 departure should be precluded. 
Alternatively, the government contended that the defendant 
has a "long and violent criminal history," which precludes 
a departure under both the present and the amended 
versions of S 5K2.13. 
 
The en banc court granted the motion for 
reconsideration. We wrote: 
 
       A majority of the en banc court has voted to grant the 
       motion for reconsideration, and hence it is hereby 
       granted. However, the premise of the reconsideration is 
       the Sentencing Commission's clarifying amendment to 
       S 5K2.13 becoming operative. Since that event cannot 
       occur until November 1, 1998 (the date by which 
       Congress must act to prevent the amendment from 
       taking effect), the court has decided to stay the 
       mandate until that date, and it is hereby stayed. If 
       Congress rejects the amendment, the original en banc 
       opinion shall take effect and the clerk will issue the 
       mandate accordingly. If Congress does not by 
       November 1, 1998 act, the clerk shall enter an order 
       formally vacating the opinion on the docket. The court 
       will thereafter decide whether or not to remand the 
       matter to the district court for further proceedings. 
 
United States v. Askari, No. 95-1662, Order Sur Petition for 
Reconsideration of En Banc Opinion (3d Cir. Aug. __, 1998) 
(en banc) ("Askari III"). The November 1 deadline has now 
passed without congressional action, and the amendment 




The parties agree that the amendment to S 5K2.13 does 
not work a substantive change in the law, but rather 
"clarifies" the Guideline in place at the time of sentencing. 
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Under our precedents, we therefore must give effect to the 
amended version in the present case. See United States v. 
Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 490 (3d Cir. 1998). While the en 
banc court could conceivably revisit the case "from 
scratch," we have agreed that the better course, particularly 
in light of the sharp disagreements we have had over the 
meaning of a number of still relevant terms, is to remand 
to the district court so that it can resentence Askari in light 
of the Amended Guideline. In addition to possible legal 
interpretation, two factfinding issues remain in the wake of 
the amendment: (1) whether Askari's offense involved 
"actual violence or a serious threat of violence;" and (2) 
whether Askari's criminal history indicates "a need to 
incarcerate the defendant or protect the public." See 
S 5K2.13. 
 
The first issue most likely still divides the court. 
Concomitantly, there may also be some disagreement 
whether this is an issue of fact or law. We think it 
preferable for the district court first to rule on the meaning 
of "serious threat of injury" within the context of the 
amended Guidelines. The second issue seems even more 
clearly to be an issue for the district court rather than the 
en banc court of appeals. The district court did not make 
an explicit finding of dangerousness vel non, perhaps 
because it found in light of Rosen that a downward 
departure for diminished capacity was limited to non- 
violent offenses (App. at 45a). The district court deserves 
another opportunity to make this determination. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the en banc opinion of this 
court, filed April 8, 1998, will be vacated, and the case 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
In my opinion, despite the import of the new guidelines, 
the order of the district court should be affirmed. According 
to the newly enacted version of U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13, a 
diminished capacity departure is not warranted if "the facts 
and circumstances of the defendant's offense indicate a 
need to protect the public because the offense involved 
actual violence or a serious threat of violence." (emphasis 
added). Askari entered a bank on Walnut Street in 
Philadelphia on April 23, 1992 with his hand underneath 
his shirt so as to convey the impression that he was 
carrying a loaded gun that he was prepared to use. He 
repeatedly told the bank tellers to put the money on the 
counter, and told one teller that she had three seconds to 
give him the money. See United States v. Askari, 140 F.3d 
536, 538 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Askari's sentence should be affirmed without remand 
because his conduct involves a serious threat of violence. 
By conveying the impression that he was carrying a loaded 
gun and was prepared to use it, Askari created a serious 
threat of violence. Although his cocked forefinger was not 
likely to have led to much damage, an on-site law 
enforcement officer, a bank security officer, a bank patron, 
or even a bystander would have been justified in 
responding to Askari's actions through violent means. 
Askari's threat was a threat of violence, and raised a 
substantial possibility of violent conduct in response. 
Compare United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994, 997, 997 n.5. 
(7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a bank robber who stated that 
he had a gun in his coat was eligible for two point 
enhancement for making a death threat even though robber 
was simply pointing his finger through his coat, and noting 
that whether he actually had a gun was "immaterial"). 
 
Accordingly, I see no need to remand this case to the 
district court, as Askari's actions and his undisputed felony 
background (see Maj. Op. at 4 n.2) must lead to the same 
sentence originally imposed. I respectfully dissent. 
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